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Abstract
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with a coalition structure, in
such a way that they generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. By considering the property of balanced contributions
within unions, two axiomatic characterizations for each one of these values are provided.
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1. Introduction
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, which form a parametric family of coalitional values, are especially
suited for the study of cooperative games where the players may show some (common) tendency as to the size of the
coalitions they would agree to form. It is assumed that this tendency is deﬁned by some parameter that ranges the
interval [0, 1]. These values have been recently applied [9] to the analysis of an interesting coalition formation political
problem.
Example 1.1. The problem arose in the Catalonia Parliament at the beginning of Legislature 2003–2006, prematurely
ﬁnished. Curiously, the analysis remains still valid for Legislature 2006–2010 since, in spite of the modiﬁcation of the
seat distribution issued from the elections held in November 1, 2006, the strategic possibilities are exactly the same.
In Catalonia, politics is based on two main axes: the classical left-to-right axis and a crossed one going from Spanish
centralism to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism). The positions of the parties in such a two-dimensional ideological
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Fig. 1. Position of parties in a two-dimensional ideological space.
Table 1
Classical measures of power in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2006
(a) (b) (c)
(NO) (C) (LW) (NO) (C) (LW) (NO) (C) (LW)
CiU 0.4000 0.5000 0 0.6250 0.5000 0 0.6250 0.6250 0
PSC 0.2333 0 0.3889 0.3750 0 0.3750 0.3750 0 0.4167
ERC 0.2333 0.5000 0.3889 0.3750 0.5000 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.4167
PPC 0.0667 0 0 0.1250 0 0 0.1250 0 0
ICV 0.0667 0 0.2222 0.1250 0 0.1250 0.1250 0 0.1667
space could be represented as in Fig. 1, where we attach to each party the number of seats obtained in 2003. The links
between ERC, PSC and ICV on one hand, and ERC and CiU on the other, deﬁne afﬁnities and hence the politically
likely minimal winning coalitions.
Thus, in 2003 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical nationalist and left-wing party, was faced with
the dilemma of choosing among either a Catalanist majority coalition with Convergència i Unió (CiU) or a left-wing
majority coalition with the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya–Verds (ICV), which
was ﬁnally formed in 2003 and has been repeated in 2006.
A classical approach would consist in using either (a) the Shapley value [18] and the Owen value [14], (b) the
Banzhaf value [13] and the Banzhaf–Owen value [15] or, alternatively, (c) the Banzhaf value [13] and the symmetric
coalitional Banzhaf value [4], in order to evaluate the strategic possibilities of each party in both setups. The results are
given in Table 1, where (NO) means no coalition formation, (C) means that CiU + ERC forms and (LW) means that
PSC + ERC + ICV forms.
According to the Shapley and Owen values used in (a), ERC would strictly prefer joining CiU instead of PSC and
ICV. The same conclusion is obtained according to the Banzhaf and Banzhaf–Owen values used in (b). In both cases, the
results fail to provide a mathematical explanation of ERC’s actual decision (to join PSC and ICV). Instead, according
to the Banzhaf and symmetric coalitional Banzhaf values used in (c), ERC would strictly prefer joining PSC and ICV
instead of CiU.
As is shown in Section 2, for p = 12 the Banzhaf value is the p-binomial semivalue and the symmetric coali-
tional Banzhaf value is the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue. Therefore, more generally, by using binomial
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semivalues—and symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues whenever a coalition structure exists—the conclusion of
the theoretical analysis is that ERC, the crucial agent in this scenario, was not necessarily forced to participate in the
left-wing tripartite government but would have got more political power in joining CiU depending on the tendency of
the parties. More precisely, ERC should have chosen PSC and ICV if, and only if, the tendency parameter p was in
the interval ((5 − √5)/10, (5 + √5)/10) and hence ERC should have preferred CiU for 44.72% of possibilities. The
details can be found in [9].
This distinction, and hence the increase of strategic options for ERC, cannot be discovered by merely using the
traditional (rigid) coalitional values: it follows only from the possibility to let a parameter vary, which is just one of the
main features of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues.
A second main aspect of these values, still referring to a voting setup, is that they use a binomial semivalue (a
generalization of the Banzhaf value) as a power measure in the quotient game (once a coalition structure is formed) but
share then within each union the power so obtained by applying the Shapley value to an internal game that concerns
only the players of that union. This looks highly interesting since, once an alliance is formed—and, especially, if it
supports a coalition government—cabinet ministries, parliamentary and institutional positions, budget management
and other political responsibilities have to be distributed among the members of the coalition efﬁciently, whence in a
way as close as possible to the one suggested by the Shapley value. This two-step procedure (ﬁrst power, then cake)
offers a balanced approach for dealing with coalitional bargaining.
How far from the classical framework does this lead us? Which is the price we must pay, in terms of mathematical
properties, for introducing a parameter in our evaluation of games and games with a coalition structure? In other words:
which are the theoretical foundations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues? The aim of this paper is that
of providing these foundations by establishing several axiomatic characterizations of these values. (We include in the
appendix a historical note where we brieﬂy recall some existing literature on coalitional values in order to better place
the new values with regard to those already known.)
Therefore we state here two axiomatic characterizations for each symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue, both
based on the interesting property of balanced contributions within unions. First we use it jointly with additivity, the
dummy player property, symmetry in the quotient game and the coalitional p-binomial total power property. Next, we
prove that the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue is the unique coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue
that satisﬁes balanced contributions within unions and the quotient game property.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries is provided. In Section 3 we
recall the deﬁnition of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, introduce the property of balanced contributions
within unions and state and prove the characterization theorems.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Games and semivalues
Let N be a ﬁnite set of players and 2N be the set of coalitions (subsets of N). A cooperative game on N is a function
v: 2N → R, that assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N with v(∅) = 0. A game v is monotonic if
v(S)v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A player i ∈ N is a dummy in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}.
Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Endowed with the natural operations for real-valued functions, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space
GN . For every nonempty coalition T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is deﬁned by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0
otherwise. Finally, every permutation  of N induces a linear automorphism of GN given by (v)(S)= v(−1S) for all
S ⊆ N and all v.
By a value on GN we will mean a map f :GN → RN , that assigns to every game v a vector f [v] with components
fi[v] for all i ∈ N .
Following the axiomatic description given in [20], :GN → RN is a semivalue (on GN ) iff it satisﬁes the following
properties:
(i) linearity: [v + v′] = [v] + [v′] and [v] = [v] if v, v′ ∈ GN and  ∈ R;
(ii) anonymity: i[v] = i[v] for all  on N, i ∈ N and v ∈ GN ;
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(iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then [v]0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game v, then i[v] = v({i}).
In [10] there is an interesting characterization of semivalues by means of weighting coefﬁcients. Set n = |N |. Then:
(a) for every weighting vector {pk}n−1k=0 such that
∑n−1
k=0pk
(
n−1
k
)
= 1 and pk0 for all k, the expression
i[v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN ,
where s =|S|, deﬁnes a semivalue ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained this way; (c) the correspondence
given by {pk}n−1k=0 
→  is bijective.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value  [18], for which pk =1/n
(
n−1
k
)
, and the Banzhaf value
 [13], for which pk = 21−n. The Shapley value  is the only efﬁcient semivalue, in the sense that∑i∈Ni[v] = v(N)
for every v ∈ GN .
Notice that these two classical values are deﬁned for each N. The same happens with the binomial semivalues,
introduced in [17] as follows. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and pk =pk(1−p)n−k−1 for k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 (by convention, we take
00 = 1 if p = 0 or p = 1). Then {pk}n−1k=0 is a weighting vector and deﬁnes a semivalue on GN that will be denoted as
p and called the p-binomial semivalue. Of course, 1/2 = .
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Puente [17]). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. A value f on GN satisﬁes the p-binomial total power property if∑
i∈N
fi[v] =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps(1 − p)n−s−1[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all v ∈ GN .
Proposition 2.2 (Carreras and Puente [9]). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. The unique semivalue on GN that satisﬁes the p-binomial
total power property is the p-binomial semivaluep. Hence,
∑
i∈Ni[v]=
∑
i∈N
p
i [v] for all v ∈ GN implies=p.
In particular, by setting p = 12 we obtain that the Banzhaf value  is the only semivalue that satisﬁes the classical
total power property:
∑
i∈N
fi[v] = 12n−1
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all v ∈ GN. 
Which is the reason for letting p range from 0 to 1? Notice that a reasonable regularity assumption on players’
behavior is that the probability to form coalitions follows a monotonic (increasing or decreasing) behavior. Then, it is
not difﬁcult to see that the only semivalues such that pk+1 = pk for all k (maybe the simplest form of monotonicity)
are precisely the p-binomial semivalues, in which case =p/(1−p) for each p ∈ [0, 1]. For example, p= 0.1 means
that the players are very reticent to form coalitions, whereas p = 0.8 means that great coalitions are more likely. The
neutral case p = 0.5 corresponds to the Banzhaf value.
Remark 2.3. (a)Within the class of all semivalues, Proposition 2.2 provides a characterizing property of each binomial
semivalue, whereas monotonicity of the weighting coefﬁcients is a characterizing property of all binomial semivalues
as a family.
(b) As pointed out by one of the referees, Proposition 2.2 is a particular case of a more general statement concerning
all semivalues (and several other values).
(c) The classical total power property of the Banzhaf value mentioned in Proposition 2.2 can be generalized to all
semivalues. Indeed, for every semivalue , deﬁned by a weighting vector {pk}n−1k=0, we have∑
i∈N
i[v] =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all v ∈ GN ,
which states that the total amount shared among the players is a weighted sum of all marginal contributions (swings in
the simple case) arising in the game, each one of them being affected by its probability to occur. This agrees with the
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standard view that each player i has only a probability ps to join coalition S ⊆ N\{i}, where s = |S|. The p-binomial
total power property is nothing but a particular case of this general statement. Just the same statement that in the case
of the Shapley value nicely gives rise to efﬁciency due to the special weighting coefﬁcients that deﬁne it.
2.2. Games with a coalition structure
Let us consider a ﬁnite set, say, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We will denote by P(N) the set of all partitions of N. Each
P ∈ P(N) is called a coalition structure or system of unions on N. The so-called trivial coalition structures are
Pn = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} and PN = {N}. A cooperative game with a coalition structure is a pair [v;P ], where v ∈ GN
and P ∈ P(N) for a given N. We denote by GcsN the set of all cooperative games with a coalition structure on N.
If [v;P ] ∈ GcsN and P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}, the quotient game vP is the cooperative game played by the unions, or,
rather, by the set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of their representatives, as follows:
vP (R) = v
(⋃
r∈R
Pr
)
for all R ⊆ M .
Unions Pr, Ps are said to be symmetric in [v;P ] if r, s are symmetric players in vP .
By a coalitional value onGcsN we will mean a map g:GcsN → RN , which assigns to every pair [v;P ] a vector g[v;P ]
with components gi[v;P ] for each i ∈ N .
Given a value f on GN , a coalitional value of f is a coalitional value g on GcsN such that g[v;Pn] = f [v] for all
v ∈ GN .
The notion of coalitional semivalue was axiomatically introduced in [1] as a map that assigns a payoff vector to
every game with a coalition structure and satisﬁes some standard properties. Formula (13) of this reference is the
analogue of our expression in Deﬁnition 3.1 below; the only difference is that, instead of the weighting coefﬁcients
of the binomial semivalue and the Shapley value, use is made in [1] of the weighting coefﬁcients of two arbitrary
semivalues. All coalitional semivalues are characterized this way in Theorem 7 [1]. It will be clear that our symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalues fall within this category.
3. The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalues
The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue represents a two-step bargaining procedure where, ﬁrst, the unions
are allocated in the quotient game the payoff given by the p-binomial semivalue p and, then, this payoff is efﬁciently
shared within each union according to the Shapley value .
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Carreras and Puente [9]). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. For any ﬁxed player set N, the symmetric coalitional
p-binomial semivalue is the coalitional value p deﬁned on GcsN by
pi [v;P ] =
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 1
pk(
pk−1
t
)
[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
for all i ∈ N and [v;P ] ∈ GcsN , where Pk ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ Pk and Q =
⋃
r∈RPr . In case p = 12 , we get
1/2 =, the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced in [4].Also note that the Shapley value (when P =PN ),
all binomial semivalues (when P = Pn) and the Banzhaf value (when, moreover, p = 12 ) will arise as particular cases(cf. Theorem 3.5 below).
Deﬁnition 3.2. A coalitional value g on GcsN satisﬁes the property of balanced contributions within unions if, for all[v;P ] ∈ GcsN , all Pk ∈ P and all i, j ∈ Pk ,
gi[v;P ] − gi[v;P−j ] = gj [v;P ] − gj [v;P−i],
where P−i is the coalition structure that results when player i leaves the union s(he) belongs to, i.e.
P−i = {P1, . . . , Pk−1, Pk\{i}, Pk+1, . . . , Pm, {i}},
and P−j is deﬁned analogously. Notice that in P−i player i does not leave the game, but only union Pk .
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This property states that the loss (or gain) of a player i ∈ Pk when a player j ∈ Pk decides to leave the union and
remain alone is the same as the loss (or gain) of player j when player i decides to leave the union. It is reminiscent of
Myerson’s fairness concept [12]. The balanced contributions principle has been also used e.g. in [7] when characterizing
the level value.
Let us consider the following properties for a coalitional value g on GcsN :
• additivity: g[v + v′;P ] = g[v;P ] + g[v′;P ] for all v, v′ and P;
• dummy player property: if i is a dummy in v, then gi[v;P ] = v({i}) for all P;
• coalitional p-binomial total power property: for all [v;P ] ∈ GcsN ,∑
i∈N
gi[v;P ] =
∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)];
• symmetry in the quotient game: if Pr, Ps ∈ P are symmetric in [v;P ] then∑
i∈Pr
gi[v;P ] =
∑
j∈Ps
gj [v;P ];
• quotient game property: for all [v;P ] ∈ GcsN ,∑
i∈Pk
gi[v;P ] = gk[vP ;Pm] for all Pk ∈ P
(this property makes sense only for coalitional values deﬁned for all N; in this case, here and in the sequel we abuse
the notation and use a unique symbol g on both GcsN and G
cs
M ).
Remark 3.3. The coalitional p-binomial total power property is a natural generalization of the p-binomial total power
property (see Remark 2.3). If g is a coalitional value of a value f, both deﬁned for all N (as it is the case for p and p
for every p ∈ [0, 1]), the property is a consequence of the quotient game property, maybe much more compelling at
ﬁrst glance, and could be written as∑
i∈N
gi[v;P ] =
∑
k∈M
fk[vP ],
thus establishing that the amount shared according to g in [v;P ] coincides with the amount shared according to f in
the quotient game vP .
In Theorem 3.5 we give a ﬁrst characterization of each symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue. We will need
the next lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let p ∈ [0, 1], ∅ = S ⊆ N , s = |S| and i ∈ N . Then pi [uS] =ps−1 if i ∈ S, and pi [uS] = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Let i ∈ S. Then, if t = |T | when T ⊆ N , and r = t − s + 1,
pi [uS] =
∑
T⊆N\{i}
pt (1 − p)n−t−1[uS(T ∪ {i}) − uS(T )]
=
n−1∑
t=s−1
(
n − s
t − s + 1
)
pt (1 − p)n−t−1 = ps−1
n−s∑
r=0
(
n − s
r
)
pr(1 − p)n−s−r = ps−1.
If i /∈ S, the dummy player property of p yields pi [uS] = 0. 
Theorem 3.5 (First axiomatic characterization). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. For each N there is a unique coalitional value on GcsN
that satisﬁes additivity, the dummy player property, balanced contributions within unions, the coalitional p-binomial
total power property and symmetry in the quotient game. It is the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue p.
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Moreover, p satisﬁes the quotient game property, is a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue p and yields
p[v;PN ] = [v] for all v ∈ GN .
Proof. (a) (Existence) It sufﬁces to show that the coalitional value p satisﬁes the ﬁve properties enumerated in the
statement.
1. Additivity. It merely follows from the expression of pi [v;P ].
2. Dummy player property. Let i ∈ N be a dummy player in game v and P be any coalition structure. Assume i ∈ Pk .
Then v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T ) = v({i}) for all R and T. As, moreover,∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 = 1 and
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk(
pk−1
t
)
= 1,
we conclude that pi [v;P ] = v({i}).
3. Balanced contributions within unions. Let us take [v;P ] ∈ GcsN , with P ={P1, P2, . . . , Pm} and M ={1, 2, . . . , m}.
Let Pk ∈ P and i, j ∈ Pk . Then we have
pi [v;P ]
=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 1)!t !
pk! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
+
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}:j∈T
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 1)!t !
pk! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 1)!t !
pk! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
+
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 2)!(t + 1)!
pk! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j} ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j})],
where Q =⋃r∈RPr . We now consider
P−j = {P ′1, P ′2, . . . , P ′m+1},
where P ′h = Ph for h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , m}, P ′k = Pk\{j}, P ′m+1 = {j} and M ′ = {1, 2, . . . , m + 1}, and
get, in a similar way,
pi [v;P−j ]
=
∑
R⊆M ′\{k}
∑
T⊆P ′k\{i}
pr(1 − p)m−r (pk − t − 2)!t !
(pk − 1)! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
pr(1 − p)m−r (pk − t − 2)!t !
(pk − 1)! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
+
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
pr+1(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 2)!t !
(pk − 1)! [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j} ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j})].
Thus
pi [v;P ] − pi [v;P−j ]
=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
A1[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )] + A2[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j} ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j})],
where
A1 = pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 1)!t !
pk! − p
r(1 − p)m−r (pk − t − 2)!t !
(pk − 1)!
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and
A2 = pr(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 2)!(t + 1)!
pk! − p
r+1(1 − p)m−r−1 (pk − t − 2)!t !
(pk − 1)! .
It is easy to check that A2 = −A1, so that
pi [v;P ] − pi [v;P−j ]
=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i,j}
A1[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) + v(Q ∪ T ∪ {j}) − v(Q ∪ T ) − v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i} ∪ {j})].
Since this expression depends on i in the same way as it depends on j,
pi [v;P ] − pi [v;P−j ] = pj [v;P ] − pj [v;P−i].
4. Coalitional p-binomial total power property. Let [v;P ] ∈ GcsN . Fixing k ∈ M , for every R ⊆ M\{k} we consider
the game vR ∈ GPk deﬁned by
vR(T ) = v(Q ∪ T ) − v(Q) for all T ⊆ Pk .
The Shapley value gives, for each i ∈ Pk ,
i[vR] =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk(
pk−1
t
)
[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )].
Using the efﬁciency of , we get∑
i∈Pk
i[vR] = vR(Pk) = v(Q ∪ Pk) − v(Q) = vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R).
Hence ∑
i∈Pk
pi [v;P ] =
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)] = pk [vP ]
and, ﬁnally,∑
i∈N
pi [v;P ] =
∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)].
5. Symmetry in the quotient game. It readily follows from the relationship∑
i∈Pk
pi [v;P ] = pk [vP ],
stated in the previous point, and the anonymity of the p-binomial semivalue p.
(b) (Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional value that satisﬁes the above ﬁve properties. We will see that g is uniquely
determined, so that g = p.
Using additivity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of GN , it sufﬁces to see that g is uniquely
determined on each pair of the form [uT ;P ]. So let  ∈ R, ∅ = T ⊆ N and P ∈ P(N). Let R = {k ∈ M : T ∩ Pk =
∅} and Rk = T ∩ Pk for each k ∈ R.
Using the dummy player property it follows that gi[uT ;P ] = 0 if i /∈ T . Now we apply the coalitional p-binomial
total power property:∑
i∈N
gi[uT ;P ] =
∑
k∈M
∑
S⊆M\{k}
ps(1 − p)m−s−1[(uT )P (S ∪ {k}) − (uT )P (S)].
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It is easy to see that (uT )P = uPT . Then, by the deﬁnition of the p-binomial semivalue and its linearity, we have∑
i∈N
gi[uT ;P ] =
∑
k∈M
pk [uPT ] = 
∑
k∈M
pk [uPT ].
As, moreover, uPT = uR , using Lemma 3.4 yields∑
i∈N
gi[uT ;P ] = 
∑
k∈M
pk [uR] = 
∑
k∈R
pr−1 = rpr−1.
Let k ∈ R. From the dummy player property and symmetry in the quotient game we get∑
i∈Rk
gi[uT ;P ] =
∑
i∈Pk
gi[uT ;P ] = pr−1.
It remains to see that gi[uT ;P ] = pr−1/rk for all i ∈ Rk . To this end, we use induction on rk = |Rk|.
If rk = 1 it is obvious because Rk = {i}. So, let rk > 1. If i, j ∈ Rk , from balanced contributions within unions it
follows that
gi[uT ;P ] − gi[uT ;P−j ] = gj [uT ;P ] − gj [uT ;P−i].
Now, the cardinality of the corresponding subsets (R−i )k and (R−j )k , for both P−i and P−j , is rk − 1, whereas
|R−i | = |R−j | = r + 1, so that, by the inductive hypothesis,
gi[uT ;P−j ] = p
r
rk − 1 = gj [uT ;P−i]
and hence
gi[uT ;P ] = p
r−1
rk
= gj [uT ;P ].
This completes the uniqueness proof.
(c) First, if P = PN then
pi [v;PN ] =
∑
T⊆N\{i}
1
n(
n−1
t
)
[v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )] = i[v]
for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN . Analogously, p is a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue p. Indeed, for
P = Pn,
pi [v;Pn] =
∑
R⊆N\{i}
pr(1 − p)m−r−1[v(R ∪ {i}) − v(R)] = pi [v].
Finally, the quotient game property: as we have seen when showing the symmetry in the quotient game in part (a) of
this proof, and using the preceding property for GcsM ,∑
i∈Pk
pi [v;P ] = pk [vP ] = pk [vP ;Pm]. 
In [19], it was shown that the Owen value is the unique coalitional value of the Shapley value that satisﬁes the
properties of quotient game and balanced contributions within unions. Analogously, in [4] it was proven that the
symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value is the unique coalitional value of the Banzhaf value that satisﬁes these two
properties. In Theorem 3.6 we generalize this result.
Theorem 3.6 (Second axiomatic characterization). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue
p is the unique coalitional value of the p-binomial semivaluep deﬁned for all N that satisﬁes balanced contributions
within unions and the quotient game property.
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Proof. (a) (Existence) It follows from Theorem 3.5.
(b) (Uniqueness) Assume that g1 = g2 are coalitional values of the p-binomial semivalue p deﬁned for all N and
satisfying the above two properties. Let N be such that g1 = g2 on GcsN and take, among those [v;P ] ∈ GcsN such that
g1[v;P ] = g2[v;P ], a pair [v;P ] with the maximum number of unions m.
As g1 and g2 satisfy the quotient game property, for all k ∈ M we have∑
i∈Pk
ghi [v;P ] = ghk [vP ;Pm] for h = 1, 2,
and, from both being coalitional values of p (also on M, of course),∑
i∈Pk
g1i [v;P ] = pk [vP ] =
∑
i∈Pk
g2i [v;P ] for all k ∈ M ,
so that g1 and g2 coincide (say, additively) on each union Pk . If Pk = {i} then g1i [v;P ] = g2i [v;P ]. If pk > 1, let
i, j ∈ Pk be distinct. Using the property of balanced contributions within unions,
ghi [v;P ] − ghj [v;P ] = ghi [v;P−j ] − ghj [v;P−i] for h = 1, 2.
By the maximality of m, it follows that
g1i [v;P−j ] − g1j [v;P−i] = g2i [v;P−j ] − g2j [v;P−i]
and hence
g1i [v;P ] − g1j [v;P ] = g2i [v;P ] − g2j [v;P ],
that is,
g1i [v;P ] − g2i [v;P ] = ck (a constant) for all i ∈ Pk .
However
0 =
∑
i∈Pk
g1i [v;P ] −
∑
i∈Pk
g2i [v;P ] = pkck ,
so that ck = 0 and therefore g1 and g2 coincide on each player of Pk; thus, g1 = g2 on N, a contradiction. 
Remark 3.7 (A third axiomatic characterization). A further axiomatic characterization of each symmetric coalitional
p-binomial semivalue p was carried out in [9] by replacing the property of balanced contributions within unions in
Theorem 3.5 with
• symmetry within unions: if i, j ∈ Pk are symmetric in v then gi[v;P ] = gj [v;P ].
Remark 3.8. Let us call symmetric coalitional values to those coalitional values that satisfy additivity, the dummy
player property, balanced contributions within unions, symmetry within unions, symmetry in the quotient game and
the quotient game property. Among them we ﬁnd the Owen value, all symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues and,
in particular, the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. Instead, the Banzhaf–Owen value and its counterpart (see the
Appendix) fall out of this class. The only distinction between the Owen value and the symmetric coalitional binomial
semivalues is that the former satisﬁes efﬁciency whereas each one of the latter satisﬁes a coalitional p-binomial total
power property. This parallels the distinction between the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues (efﬁciency vs.
total power property) which generalizes Feltkamp’s work [11], and extends the comparison between the classical four
coalitional values (derived from combining the Shapley and Banzhaf values) that may be found in [3].
Remark 3.9 (Restriction to simple games). Simple games form an especially interesting class of cooperative games.
Not only as a test bed for many cooperative concepts, but also for the variety of their interpretations, some of which are
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far from game theory. In particular, they have been often applied to describe and analyze collective decision-making
mechanisms—weighted majority games have played a crucial role here—and the notion of voting power has been
closely attached to them.
While Theorem 3.6 translates without any change and gives an axiomatic characterization of each symmetric coali-
tional binomial semivalue as a coalitional power index (that is, restricted to simple games with a coalition structure),
which we will not state explicitly, in the cases of Theorem 3.5 and Remark 3.7 we get “parallel” axiomatizations on
the class of simple games by just replacing additivity with the
• transfer property: g[v ∨ v′;P ] = g[v;P ] + g[v′;P ] − g[v ∧ v′;P ] for all v, v′ and P .
The analogue of Theorem 3.5 for simple games is given below without proof (which is very similar to that of Theorem
3.5). In the case of the analogue of the characterization mentioned in Remark 3.7, we refer the reader again to [9] for
a detailed statement.
Theorem 3.10 (Axiomatic characterization on simple games). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. For any N there is a unique coalitional
power index on SGcsN , the domain of all simple games with a coalition structure on N, that satisﬁes the transfer
property, the dummy player property, balanced contributions within unions, the coalitional p-binomial total power
property and symmetry in the quotient game. It is (the restriction to SGcsN of) the symmetric coalitional p-binomial
semivalue p.
Moreover, p satisﬁes the quotient game property and yields, for every simple game v on N, p[v;Pn] = p[v]
and p[v;PN ] = [v].
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Appendix A.
Games with a coalition structure were ﬁrst considered by Aumann and Drèze [6], who extended the Shapley value
to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from
each other, and every player receives the payoff allocated to him by the Shapley value in the subgame he is playing
within his union. A second approach was used by Owen [14] when introducing and axiomatically characterizing the
coalitional value (Owen value). In this case, the unions play a quotient game among themselves, and each one receives
a payoff which, in turn, is shared among its players in an internal game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions
and within each union for its players, are given by the Shapley value.
By applying a similar procedure to the Banzhaf value, Owen [15] got a second coalitional value, themodiﬁedBanzhaf
value for games with a coalition structure or Banzhaf–Owen value. In this case the payoffs at both levels, that of the
unions in the quotient game and that of the players within each union, are given by the Banzhaf value.
Alonso and Fiestras [4] realized that the Banzhaf–Owen value fails to satisfy two interesting properties of the Owen
value: symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property. Then they suggested to modify the two-step
allocation scheme and use the Banzhaf value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley value within unions.
This gave rise to the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, the ﬁrst mixed (or heterogeneous) coalitional value.
More or less simultaneously, but independently, Amer et al. [5] introduced a second mixed (or heterogeneous)
coalitional value, which may now be viewed as a sort of “counterpart” of the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value since
it applies the Shapley value in the quotient game and the Banzhaf value within unions.
Later on, Albizuri and Zarzuelo [1] deﬁned and studied coalitional semivalues, thus giving a general procedure for
extending semivalues to the coalitional context. Each coalitional semivalue can be obtained by combining two arbitrary
(maybe coincident) semivalues in a two-step procedure: the ﬁrst one applies for unions in the quotient game and the
other for players within each union. Therefore, the Owen value, the Banzhaf–Owen value, the symmetric coalitional
Banzhaf value and its counterpart (which completes the four possibilities to combine the Shapley and Banzhaf values)
fall within the notion of coalitional semivalue, although we should call homogeneous to the former two in order to
distinguish them from the heterogeneous (mixed) latter two.
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The idea of p-binomial semivalue was ﬁrst given by Puente [17]. Carreras and Puente [9] extended this concept
to games with a coalition structure and obtained at the same time a wide generalization of the Alonso–Fiestras value
(essentially: p ∈ [0, 1] instead of p= 12 ), the family of symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalues. Each one of them
can also be considered as a particular case of coalitional semivalue since the payoff to unions is given by the p-binomial
semivalue in the quotient game and is shared within each union according to the Shapley value.
It is worth to mention that, in the context of games with a coalition structure, the multilinear extension technique
has been applied to computing the Owen value [16], the Banzhaf–Owen value [8], the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf
value and its counterpart [2] and all symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues [9].
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